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noitepg Is India’s Foreign Policy Being Subordinated To US Interests? | MarginSpeak

Anti-imperialist Stance: Congress Party workers in Kolkata reacting to the allegation that USAID, an American agency, allotted $21 million to fund ‘voter turnout’ in India. It turned out that the fund was likely approved for Bangladesh, not India Photo: AP Anti-imperialist Stance: Congress Party workers in Kolkata reacting to the allegation that USAID, an American agency, allotted $21 million to fund ‘voter turnout’ in India. It turned out that the fund was likely approved for Bangladesh, not India Photo: AP

In recent yearsnoitepg, India’s foreign policy initiatives have increasingly shown signs of yielding to pressure from the United States. Notably, in a bid to ease trade tensions and secure closer economic and defence ties with Washington, the Indian government has reduced tariffs on several key US imports. It is clearly linked to overtures by President Donald Trump—who has long derided India as a ‘tariff king’ for imposing steep trade barriers—and as an effort to recalibrate bilateral trade towards achieving a target of doubling commerce to $500 billion by 2030. The recapitulation has been starker in the crucial areas of defence, which could potentially impact India’s military strategies. To many, this pro-imperialist bias in the government may be surprising given its claim to be the ultra-nationalist party, but it is quite consistent with the history of its parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

India’s Geopolitical Position

US policy towards India can be broadly divided into several historical phases. In the early years after India’s independence, US policy was cautious and ambivalent. India’s commitment to non-alignment, its socialist economic model, and its closer ties with the Soviet Union meant that Washington viewed New Delhi with a mix of suspicion and strategic distance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the post-Cold War years, the US began to see India as an emerging democratic power and a potential counterbalance to China. This period saw gradual warming, highlighted by increased economic, technological and defence cooperation.

Initiatives like the nuclear deal in 2008 marked a significant turning point, as the US sought to integrate India into its broader strategic framework. In the strategic partnership era (2000s-2016), with the rise of China and shifting global dynamics, India increasingly became a key partner for the US in the Indo-Pacific. Under administrations from Bush through Obama, bilateral ties deepened significantly through formal agreements, strategic dialogues, and joint initiatives in defence and trade, reflecting a shared vision of countering Chinese influence in Asia.

During the Trump regime of 2017-21, the US administration introduced a more transactional and protectionist approach. While continuing to emphasise India’s strategic importance—especially as a counterweight to China—Trump’s policy was characterised by unilateral trade measures and tariff pressures. He frequently criticised India for its high tariffs and pushed for reciprocal trade reforms. This phase thus represents a shift from the more ideologically and strategically grounded partnership of previous eras to a model where economic leverage and direct, forceful trade negotiation tactics played a prominent role.

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Parallel to economic adjustments, a notable realignment in India’s geopolitical posture has emerged. Historically, the US has viewed India as a crucial buffer state against China—a role that justified a degree of strategic flexibility. However, the US leadership now criticises India’s inability to effectively contain Chinese influence in the region. In the circumstances, instead of maintaining an independent balancing act, India appears increasingly inclined to adjust its policies to accommodate US priorities, even if that means distancing itself from longstanding ties with Russia. Recent analyses observe that India’s gradual turn away from Russia—once a dependable defence partner and supplier of critical military hardware—is emblematic of this shift. By embracing closer economic and strategic cooperation with Washington, India risks eroding its traditional autonomy, leaving it vulnerable to American demands that come with fewer geopolitical strings attached.

The original rationale behind India’s strategic positioning was to exercise an independent balancing act in a multipolar Asia, leveraging its relationships with both Washington and Moscow to serve its national interests. Yet, by capitulating on tariff reforms and implicitly distancing from Russia, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government appears to be subordinating India’s independent strategic calculus to US interests. The US, for its part, has not only pressed for greater tariff reciprocity but also seeks to convert India from a buffer into a more compliant partner—one that is expected to prioritise American defence sales and technology transfers over its traditional ties with other global players.

The BJP government’s policy adjustments—especially the tariff cuts on US imports and the corresponding distancing from Russia—can be seen as emblematic of a broader capitulation to Trump’s overtures. While these steps promise short-term benefits in terms of trade and defence cooperation, they also expose India to the risk of becoming a subordinate partner within an American-dominated strategic framework. As the US shifts from using India merely as a strategic buffer to demanding a more unconditional alignment with its interests, India faces a crucial crossroads: preserve its hard-won strategic autonomy or further accede to US imperatives in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.

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Trump Effect on Tariffs

The Government of India has implemented several measures in the 2025 Union budget to address Trump’s concerns and improve trade relations. Key provisions include a significant reduction in basic customs duty on imported motorcycles, particularly benefitting brands like Harley-Davidson, which Trump had specifically named. Import duties on luxury cars have been reduced from 125 per cent to 70 per cent. Unsurprisingly, accounting for the imposition of Agriculture Infrastructure Development Cess (AIDC) of 40 per cent, the effective duty will be 110 per cent. The government is reviewing tariffs on over 30 imported items, including luxury cars, solar cells and chemicals. This initiative aims to potentially increase imports from the US and other trading partners, signalling India’s commitment to fair trade practices.

India has reduced tariffs on various imports and signalled a willingness to purchase more American energy products to address trade imbalances.

Former Finance Secretary Tuhin Kanta Pandey emphasised India’s intention to avoid a protectionist image by cutting import duties on many goods. This stance is designed to foster a more open and competitive market environment, aligning with global trade norms. Further, India has reduced tariffs on various imports and signalled a willingness to purchase more American energy products to address trade imbalances. It has also hinted at broader trade negotiations,7jogos cassino possibly leading to a free trade agreement. However, the imposition of reciprocal tariffs by the US could hurt Indian exports, especially as the economy struggles to regain momentum. India’s average tariff rate is significantly higher than that of the US, particularly in sectors like agriculture and transport equipment, where Indian tariffs are much steeper. This tariff disparity has contributed to India’s trade surplus with the US, but the new trade policies may impact this dynamic.

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Concessions to Western Interests

The BJP government’s strategic and economic policies have increasingly leaned towards closer ties with Western powers, often at the expense of India’s traditional emphasis on non-alignment and self-reliance. Critics argue that in the pursuit of defence contracts and trade deals, the government has compromised core nationalist interests. The ongoing discussions over acquiring advanced fighter jets like the F-35 exemplify this shift. Rather than upholding a legacy of non-alignment and indigenous defence production, India is aligning its military procurement with US and Western requirements. Many see this trend as a concession to Western ‘imperialist’ interests—a means to maintain power and global standing through deeper integration with American-led defence structures, even if it sidelines India’s strategic autonomy.

This shift also creates contradictions. In 2018, the Indian government signed a $5.43 billion deal with Russia to procure the S-400 air defence system. However, the US strongly opposes any country operating both the F-35 and the S-400, citing concerns that the latter’s radars could track and potentially compromise the stealth fighter’s characteristics and electronic warfare capabilities. This places India in a difficult position, forced to navigate between its historical defence ties with Russia and its growing strategic engagement with the US, while also considering the increasing threats posed by China.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) currently operates with just 30 fighter squadrons, well below its authorised strength of 42.5 squadrons. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) continues to struggle with the production of even fourth-generation Tejas jets. With India’s indigenous fifth-generation fighter project—the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA)—still at least 10-12 years away from production, the IAF is keen on acquiring two to three squadrons (36 to 54 jets) of F-35s as an interim solution. “If you need deterrence to prevent wars, you obviously need capabilities,” an IAF official told The Times of India.

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Currently, the world’s operational fifth-generation fighter jets include the American F-35 Lightning II and F/A-22 Raptor, China’s Chengdu J-20, and Russia’s Sukhoi-57. China has stationed J-20s near India’s borders and is expected to supply a variant to Pakistan soon. Additionally, Beijing has recently tested two new sixth-generation fighter prototypes, further intensifying regional security concerns.

If India moves forward with the F-35 deal, multiple factors must be carefully weighed, including cost, technology access, long-term maintenance expenses and geopolitical repercussions. Moreover, ensuring that India’s AMCA project remains a priority will be crucial. The government allocated Rs 15,000 crore for its development last year, but delays in indigenous production could further deepen India’s dependence on foreign defence suppliers, challenging its longstanding aspirations for strategic self-reliance.

The BJP government broke from India’s non-alignment policy by signing the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US in 2016, allowing the mutual use of military bases. Unlike the Congress-led governments that engaged China diplomatically, the BJP government aligned India with US strategic interests, particularly in countering China. Its push to privatise the defence sector further entrenches a militarised nationalism that serves both Hindutva and US imperial goals—an ideological continuity from the RSS, which envisions a militarised Hindu nation.

Though the RSS projects itself as ultra-nationalist, its history is distinctly pro-imperialist. Its ideological leaders—Savarkar, Hedgewar and Golwalkar—never actively opposed British rule. Instead, they prioritised constructing a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ over the anti-colonial struggle. Savarkar, after his early radicalism, aligned with British interests by focusing on communal issues. Hedgewar, after a brief involvement with revolutionary groups, steered the RSS away from anti-colonial activities. Golwalkar even dismissed anti-British fervour as reactionary, arguing that Muslims, Christians and Communists—not imperialism—were the real enemies of ‘Hindu India’.

The RSS’s historical record reveals not resistance to imperialism, but complicity with British rule through its divisive, communal politics—aligning closely with the colonial strategy of divide and rule. India has already been pushed to the economic brink over the past decade. Goldman Sachs estimates that tariff reductions at Trump’s insistence alone could shrink India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 0.1 to 0.6 percentage points, signalling further economic strain.

(Views expressed are personal)

Anand Teltumbde is an Indian scholar, writer and human rights activist

This article is a part of Outlook's March 21, 2025 issue 'The Pilgrim's Progress', which explores the unprecedented upsurge in religious tourism in India. It appeared in print as 'No Brotherhoodnoitepg, This'